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A B S T R A C T
Previous research has shown that communicative-pragmatic ability, as well as executive functions (EF) and Theory of
Mind (ToM), may be impaired in individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI). However, the role of such cognitive
deficits in explaining communicative-pragmatic difficulty in TBI has still not been fully investigated. The study exam-
ined the relationship between EF (working memory, planning and flexibility) and ToM and communicative-pragmatic
impairment in patients with TBI. 30 individuals with TBI and 30 healthy controls were assessed using the Assessment
Battery of Communication (ABaCo), and a set of cognitive, EF and ToM, tasks. The results showed that TBI participants
performed poorly in comprehension and production tasks in the ABaCo, using both linguistic and extralinguistic means
of expression, and that they were impaired in EF and ToM abilities. Cognitive difficulties were able to predict the prag-
matic performance of TBI individuals, with both executive functions and ToM contributing to explaining patients’ scores
on the ABaCo.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
A number of studies have confirmed that traumatic brain injury
(TBI) is associated with communicative-pragmatic impairments
(Angeleri et al., 2008; Bara, Tirassa, & Zettin, 1997; Bosco, Angeleri,
Sacco, & Bara, 2015; Johnson & Turkstra, 2012). The aim of this
paper is to investigate the relationship between this well–established
communication disorder and the underlying cognitive components
that might be responsible for such impairment. In particular, we fo-
cused our attention on two domains of cognitive functioning, usually
found to be impaired after TBI, i.e. Theory of Mind (ToM) and execu-
tive functions (EF), (e.g., Ashman, Gordon, Cantor, & Hibbard, 2006;
Dikmen et al., 2009). The role of these cognitive abilities in prag-
matic performance after TBI is still unclear and difficult to disentan-
gle (Honan, McDonald, Gowland, Fisher, & Randall, 2015; Martin &
McDonald, 2003; McDonald, 2013; McDonald et al., 2014). This pa-
per will contribute to improving the understanding of this issue.
A wide number of definitions exist to explain the notion of prag-
matics (see Levinson, 1983). They include the study of meaning in
relation to the use of language, as the relationship between signs and
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their users; the ability to use language and other means of expression,
such as gestures and paralinguistic indicators, to convey communica-
tive meaning; the ability to manage conversations and discourse analy-
sis (Bara, 2010; Cummings, 2005). In the present investigation we fo-
cus on linguistic and extralinguistic (non-verbal) abilities to convey
meaning in a social context.
Communicative-pragmatic abilities of individuals with TBI may
be impaired, making it difficult for them to manage communicative
interactions at various levels: their understanding of the non-literal
meaning of utterances is often incorrect or incomplete (e.g., Winner
& Gardner, 1977), they often have difficulty grasping the pragmatic
implications of sentences, as in the case of understanding sarcasm
(Channon et al., 2007; McDonald, 1992; McDonald & Pearce, 1996),
humor (Braun, Lissier, Baribeau, & Ethier, 1989; Docking, Murdoch,
& Jordan, 2000), or commercial messages involving inferential rea-
soning (Pearce, McDonald, & Coltheart, 1998). Pragmatic impairment
is not limited to linguistic comprehension, but also extends to the pro-
duction of communicative acts. For example, individuals with TBI are
reportedly poor at negotiating efficient requests (McDonald & Van
Sommers, 1993), and at giving the right amount of information to their
interlocutor (McDonald, 1993).
Interestingly, difficulties have also been documented for the ex-
tralinguistic modality, which represents the ability to communicate
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2017.01.007
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through gestures, facial expressions, and body posture (Bara, Cutica,
& Tirassa, 2001; Rousseaux, Vérigneaux, & Kozlowski, 2010). In-
dividuals with TBI often suffer from a general difficulty in manag-
ing social interactions in their everyday life (e.g., Struchen, Pappadis,
Sander, Burrows, & Myszka, 2011), also characterized by conver-
sational problems, such as managing turn taking (Murphy, Huang,
Montgomery, & Turkstra, 2015), and narrative disorders (Dardier et
al., 2011; Marini, Zettin, & Galetto, 2014; Marini et al., 2011).
In recent decades the cognitive aspects underlying pragmatic im-
pairment have also been the subject of growing interest (e.g., Bambini
et al., 2016; Cummings, 2009, 2014; Perkins, 2000; Stemmer, 1999).
Even if the specific pattern of deficits resulting from traumatic brain
injuries may differ widely depending on the lesion site, the type of
damage, and the time after injury, individuals with TBI usually suf-
fer from damage to the frontal lobes, resulting in deficits in execu-
tive functions, the construct used to describe the ability to manage
goal-directed behavior (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Executive functions
include abilities crucial to the efficient use of communication, such
as self-regulation, organization, and planning; some authors have pro-
posed that executive dysfunction is the main cause of pragmatic im-
pairment in TBI (Channon & Watts, 2003; Douglas, 2010; McDonald
& Pearce, 1998). Channon and Watts (2003) found TBI individuals
to be impaired in the comprehension of indirect speech acts, as well
as in executive tasks indexing working memory, inhibition and mul-
titasking. The authors found that only inhibitory processes provided a
significant contribution for explaining pragmatic performance in pa-
tients with TBI, while no association was found between working
memory, multitasking and pragmatic tasks. Douglas (2010) evaluated
pragmatic-communication difficulties in TBI individuals using the La
Trobe Communication Questionnaire (LCQ; Douglas, O'Flaherty, &
Snow, 2000), and she also provided different measures of executive
skills, i.e. verbal fluency, the ability to maintain and manipulate in-
formation, and the speed of verbal processing. The author found that
executive skills, in particular verbal fluency, were able to explain ap-
proximately a third of the variance in pragmatic performance of TBI
individuals.
Communicative-pragmatic impairment in individuals with TBI has
also been linked to a deficit in ToM, i.e. the ability to infer others’
mental states, such as beliefs and intentions (Premack & Woodruff,
1978). Some authors have argued that ToM plays a critical role in
human communication: understanding another person’s mental state
is essential in order to modify it and to achieve a specific commu-
nicative effect, i.e. to induce the partner to believe or to do some-
thing (Bosco, Bono, & Bara, 2012; Cummings, 2015; Happé & Loth,
2002; Tirassa, Bosco, & Colle, 2006a, 2006b). Several studies have
reported poor comprehension of ToM tasks in individuals with TBI
(Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Geraci, Surian, Ferraro, & Cantagallo,
2010; Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010; Milders, Ietswaart,
Crawford, & Currie, 2006; Muller et al., 2010; Spikman, Timmerman,
Milders, Veenstra, & van der Naalt, 2012), and some authors have
suggested that this difficulty may be crucial to understanding their
pragmatic impairment (Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999;
Havet-Thomassin, Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx, & Le Gall, 2006; Martin
& McDonald, 2003).
McDonald and Flanagan (2004) assessed a group of individu-
als with TBI using the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT,
McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2003). The authors found
that the ability to understand conversational meaning was closely re-
lated to the ability to interpret speakers’ intentions, when measured
by second-order ToM tasks (but not by first-order ones). First-order
ToM tasks investigate a person’s ability to infer the mental state of
another person (Wimmer & Perner, 1983); second-order ToM tasks
investigate the ability to comprehend what a person thinks, knows
and or believes about another person’s mental state, and they require
a greater cognitive load in order to be understood (Perner & Wimmer,
1985). In line with these results, Channon, Pellijeff, and Rule (2005)
reported that individuals with closed head injury performed poorly in
understanding sarcasm, and that their difficulties were related to their
mentalizing abilities, in particular to the incorrect or inadequate appre-
ciation of the mental states of the characters involved in their tasks.
Byom and Turkstra (2012) also showed that individuals with TBI used
a reduced pattern of mental-state term types, compared to their peers,
when conversing with friends about intimate topics.
Very few studies have examined the relationship between ToM and
EF in individuals with TBI and tried to disentangle the unique con-
tribution of ToM or executive functions to their communicative-prag-
matic performance. Martin and McDonald (2005), for example, found
that ToM deficits were not able to predict impaired irony comprehen-
sion, while physical inferential reasoning, i.e. the ability to compre-
hend complex non-mental inferences applying the principles of phys-
ical causation to a sequence of events, was a strong predictor. They
also measured other cognitive components (including conceptual rea-
soning, cognitive flexibility and working memory). However, none of
them was able to predict participants’ ability to comprehend irony.
In a recent study, McDonald et al. (2014) investigated the contri-
bution of executive functions (cognitive flexibility and inhibition) and
ToM in TBI individuals, by administering a speech production task in
which the patients were presented with different sets of photographs
that they had to describe to a partner. The authors found that both
executive functions and ToM had a unique effect on the speech pro-
duction task, but also that cognitive flexibility was the best predic-
tor of pragmatic performance. Moreover, ToM difficulties were able
to predict poor performance by patients in language production tasks
but only when the tasks implied strong inhibition, such as when par-
ticipants were asked to think about a specific event from their own
perspective, and then inhibit that perspective and switch to someone
else’s perspective. This result suggests a critical role of inhibition abil-
ities in ToM reasoning (see also Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004).
These findings seem to indicate that theory of mind does play a role
in communication, but also that this role tends to decrease when the
contribution of executive functions is controlled; the idea of a do-
main-specific contribution of ToM in predicting pragmatic deficits
in individuals with TBI is thus not well supported. In a more recent
study, Honan et al. (2015) studied individuals with severe TBI, com-
paring their performance in everyday conversation with that of healthy
controls. In particular, the study, using everyday conversation tasks,
investigated whether impaired executive functions could predict ToM
deficits. Participants with TBI were compared with controls in tasks
demanding low or high ToM in four different experimental conditions:
(i) high working memory (WM) (ii) high flexibility (iii) high inhibi-
tion and (vi) low cognitive load. The results showed that TBI indi-
viduals only performed less well than the control group in high-ToM
tasks in the high WM condition. The authors suggested that ToM im-
pairments in everyday communication in individuals with TBI may be
attributable to higher demands on WM.
To conclude, there is still a lack of conclusive evidence regarding
the nature of the relationship among ToM, executive functions, and
pragmatic abilities, and more empirical work is needed.
1.1. The present study
The purposes of this study were to investigate the ability of pa-
tients with TBI to understand and produce linguistic and extralinguis-
tic communicative-pragmatic tasks, and to examine the role of cogni-
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formance. We expected that individuals with TBI perform worse than
healthy controls in comprehension and production on the linguis-
tic and extralinguistic scales of the Assessment battery for Commu-
nication (Angeleri, Bara, Bosco, Colle, & Sacco, 2015; Angeleri,
Bosco, Gabbatore, Bara, & Sacco, 2012; Angeleri et al., 2008; Bosco,
Angeleri, Zuffranieri, Bara, & Sacco, 2012). We also expected that pa-
tients with TBI perform worse than controls in the cognitive tasks ad-
ministered: i.e. background neuropsychological functions - attention
and long-term memory-, EF - planning, cognitive flexibility and work-
ing memory-, and ToM. Finally, we conducted hierarchical regression
to evaluate the role of background neuropsychological functions, EF
and ToM in explaining the severity of patients’ pragmatic deficits.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty individuals with TBI (23 male; 7 female) and 30 healthy in-
dividuals (23 male; 7 female) took part in the present study. The age of
TBI participants ranged from 20 to 68 years (M = 37.13; SD = 11.36);
education ranged from 5 to 18 years of schooling (M = 11.1;
SD = 3.29). The control group consisted of 30 healthy participants,
closely matched to the experimental group in terms of sex (23 male;
7 female), age (M = 37.03, SD = 11.45) and years of education
(M = 11.8, SD = 3.17). None of them had any previous history of
brain damage or neurological disorders. The control group did not dif-
fered from the experimental one in age (T-test; t = 0.034, p = 0.97) and
years of education (T-test; t = 0.83, p = 0.41).
Participants had to meet the following criteria: (1) be at least
18 years of age; (2) be Italian native speakers; (3) provide their in-
formed consent. Participants with TBI had also to: (4) be at least
3 months post-brain injury; (5) have sufficient cognitive and commu-
nication skills to participate in the study, as resulting from the achieve-
ment of a cut-off score in a set of well-established neuropsychological
tests: the MiniMental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein,
& McHugh, 1975; cut-off: 24/30); the denomination scale of the
Aachener Aphasie Test (AAT, Huber, Poeck, Weniger, & Willmes,
1983; cut-off: no deficit), and the Token Test (De Renzi & Vignolo,
1962; cut-off: 5/6). Exclusion criteria for both TBI participants and
healthy individuals were prior history of TBI or other neurological dis-
ease, neuropsychiatric illness or communication problems, pre-morbid
alcohol or drug addiction.
The clinical characteristics of the participants with TBI are re-
ported in Table 1. The time after onset ranged from 3 to 252 months
(M = 60.1; SD = 64.21). All participants had been injured in road traf-
fic accidents, resulting in diffuse brain injury. Most of the participants
also suffered from focal damage in different brain areas, as indicated
by MRI. At the time of the study, all participants with TBI were liv-
ing at home with their caregiver (partners or relatives), and were in the
post-acute phase. None of the individuals with TBI had a history of
neurological disease, psychiatric illness, previous head injury, stroke,
antipsychotic medication use or substance abuse disorder. All partic-
ipants were right handed and able to provide their informed consent.
Finally, scores on the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) ranged from 5 to 9,
indicating that participants had sustained moderate to severe TBI (as
defined by Teasdale & Jennett, 1974).
2.2. Materials
In order to examine the participants’ pragmatic abilities we used
the linguistic and extralinguistic evaluation scales derived from the
Table 1






TBI1 M 33 13 138 Right fronto-parietal
TBI2 M 37 8 46 Right fronto-temporal
TBI3 F 26 18 30 Right fronto-parieto-
temporal
TBI4 M 45 13 74 Right fronto-parietal
TBI5 M 21 8 32 Right fronto-temporo-
parietal
TBI6 M 49 11 64 Right fronto-temporo-
parietal
TBI7 M 20 8 41 Frontal-diffuse injury
TBI8 M 36 10 252 Right parieto-temporal
TBI9 M 27 8 35 Left frontal
TBI10 M 32 13 51 Right fronto-temporo-
parietal
TBI11 M 32 11 23 Left temporal-bilateral
parietal
TBI12 F 23 13 19 Bilateral fronto-
temporal
TBI13 M 31 11 120 Left frontal
TBI14 M 68 5 3 Right fronto-temporal
TBI15 M 59 11 7 Left fronto-temporal
TBI16 F 37 8 15 Right fronto-parieto-
temporal
TBI17 F 42 13 18 Right fronto-temporal
TBI18 M 54 18 48 Left fronto-temporal
TBI19 F 35 8 228 Bilateral frontal
TBI20 M 29 13 3 Right fronto-temporal
TBI21 M 39 8 3 Bilateral frontal
TBI22 F 36 13 34 Right fronto-temporal
TBI23 M 32 10 62 Right parietal
TBI24 M 53 18 36 Right fronto-parieto-
temporal
TBI25 M 24 8 21 Right fronto-parietal
TBI26 M 45 13 17 Right temporo-parietal
TBI27 M 41 8 65 Right temporal
TBI28 F 38 8 66 Left fronto-temporal
TBI29 M 42 13 192 Right frontal
TBI30 M 28 13 60 Left fronto-temporal
ABaCo (Assessment Battery for Communication; Angeleri et al.,
2012, 2015; Bosco et al., 2012; Sacco et al., 2008), a clinical bat-
tery designed to evaluate communicative-pragmatic ability in acquired
brain injury (Gabbatore et al., 2014; Parola et al., 2016) or psychiatric
disorders (Angeleri, Gabbatore, Bosco, Sacco, & Colle, 2016; Colle
et al., 2013). Both the linguistic and extralinguistic scales are divided
into two subscales, i.e. comprehension and production subscales. A
battery of cognitive tests was also administered to examine partici-
pants’ background neuropsychological functions (long-term memory
and attention), executive functions (working memory, planning and
cognitive flexibility) and theory of mind abilities.
2.2.1. Pragmatic assessment
Pragmatic abilities were assessed using the linguistic and extralin-
guistic scales of the ABaCo, described below. Examples for each type
of task are reported in Appendix A.
2.2.1.1. Linguistic scale
The linguistic scale includes two subscales, i.e. linguistic compre-
hension and linguistic production. The linguistic comprehension sub-
scale comprised a total of 12 tasks assessing the comprehension of
communicative acts expressed mainly through language. The com-
prehension tasks were comprised of 4 standard (2 direct and 2 in-
direct) communicative acts, 4 deceitful communicative acts, and 4
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prised a total of 12 tasks assessing the production of communicative
acts expressed mainly through language. The production tasks com-
prised 4 standard (2 direct and 2 indirect) communicative acts, 4 de-
ceitful communicative acts, and 4 ironic communicative acts.
The tasks consisted in short videos that were presented to the par-
ticipants one at a time; they portrayed two characters involved in a
communicative exchange in a typical everyday situation. The number
of words in each utterance was controlled (7 ± 2) in order to main-
tain a constant memory and attention requirement. In the compre-
hension tasks, participants had to understand the communicative ex-
change shown in the videos, while in the production tasks they had to
complete the communicative exchange with an appropriate communi-
cation act.
2.2.1.2. Extralinguistic scale
The extralinguistic scale includes two subscales, i.e. extralinguis-
tic comprehension and extralinguistic production. Each subscale com-
prised the same communication acts listed above: a total of 24 tasks
divided into 12 tasks for the comprehension subscale (4 standard -
direct and indirect - communicative acts, 4 deceitful communicative
acts, and 4 ironic communicative acts) and 12 tasks for the produc-
tion subscales (4 standard - direct or indirect- communicative acts, 4
deceitful communicative acts, and 4 ironic communicative acts). The
extralinguistic tasks investigated the comprehension and production of
communicative acts expressed through the gesture modality only.
The tasks were similar to the linguistic ones, except for the com-
municative modality used: the two characters depicted in the videos
were in this case communicating using gestures or body movements
only. As for the linguistic tasks, in the extralinguistic comprehension
tasks, participants had to understand the communicative exchange,
while in the production tasks they had to complete it with an appropri-
ate communicative gesture.
2.2.1.3. Scoring
The sessions of pragmatic assessment were video-recorded for
later coding. Two research assistants, blind to the hypothesis of the
study, coded the videotapes. For each pragmatic task the rater can
assign 1 point if the participant’s answer is correct, and 0 point if
the participant’s answer is incorrect. The score for each subscale was
then calculated as the ratio between the correct responses and the to-
tal number of answers to be given for that subscale. The coding sys-
tem for the pragmatic tasks was that described in Sacco et al. (2008),
and employed in Angeleri et al. (2008) and in Bosco, Angeleri, Colle,
Sacco, and Bara (2013), see also Angeleri et al. (2015). The agreement
between the two raters was calculated using the Intraclass Correlation
Coefficient (ICC), a measure of inter-rater concordance calculated as
the ratio of variability between subjects to the total variability com-
prising subject variability and error variability. The ICC calculated for
our scores was 0.88, that according to Altman (1991) indicates a value
of high inter-rater agreement.
2.2.2. Cognitive assessment
In order to examine cognitive performance as a predictor of prag-
matic abilities, in line with previous studies (e.g., Honan et al., 2015)
the participants had undergone neuropsychological evaluation. The
evaluation included the assessment of the basic cognitive abilities gen-
erally involved in the performance of pragmatic tasks (for example,
attention and memory), executive functions, and theory of mind abil-
ities. Appendix B details the tests used; the tasks were selected due
to their wide use and well-known robustness. Task scores were in
a number of different formats, as detailed below. Some tasks had
raw scores (RS), while others were converted into equivalent scores.
Equivalent scores (ES) are distribution-based scores that range from
0 to 4. The cutoff between 0 and 1 corresponds to the 5th percentile
of the score distribution in healthy controls; the cutoff between 3 and
4 corresponds to the median of the distribution; and the cutoffs be-
tween 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 are equally spaced between 1 and
4 (Capitani & Laiacona, 1997). Equivalent scores are widely used for
neuropsychological assessment in Italy, as they describe the patient’s
approximate level of performance better than standardized scores. Fi-
nally, some of the tests involved a single pass-fail decision (PF). To
aggregate different types of tasks into composite scores, all scores
were converted to a scale from 0 (minimum possible score) to 1 (max-
imum possible score) and then averaged.
2.2.2.1. Background neuropsychological tasks
The background cognitive functions we assessed were long-term
memory and attention. Long-term memory was evaluated with the De-
ferred Recall test (RS; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987). Attentional ca-
pacities were assessed with the Attentional Matrices (ES; Spinnler &
Tognoni, 1987).
2.2.2.2. Executive function tasks
To assess executive functions, we constructed three composite
scores: (a) Planning, defined as the ability to plan a series of actions
or thoughts in a sequential order in a goal directed fashion (Smith &
Jonides, 1999; Sullivan, Riccio, & Castillo, 2009; Thomas, Snyder,
Pietrzak, & Maruff, 2014). The planning ability composite score was
obtained by averaging scores on the Tower of London task (ES;
Shallice, 1982) and the Elithorn’s Maze Test (ES; Elithorn, 1955). (b)
Flexibility, defined as the ability to switch attention and thinking in re-
sponse to the demands set by a specific situation (Arbuthnott & Frank,
2000; Johnco, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2013; Kortte, Horner, & Windham,
2002). Flexibility was assessed by performance on the Trail Making
Test Part B – Part A (ES; Reitan, 1958). (c) Working memory. The
working memory composite was obtained by averaging scores on the
Disyllabic Word Repetition Test (ES; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), the
Corsi’s Block-Tapping Test (ES; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) and the
Immediate Recall test (RS; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987).
2.2.2.3. Theory of mind tasks
The Theory of Mind composite was obtained by averaging scores
on the Smarties Task (PF; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989),
Sally & Ann Task (PF; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), and a se-
lection of six Strange Stories (RS; Happé, 1994; we excluded items
testing communicative aspects, such as irony and metaphor).
2.3. Procedure
The participants with TBI were tested at their rehabilitation cen-
ter, where they regularly attended outpatient services, while the con-
trol participants were tested at home. The study was performed during
three individual experimental sessions, each lasting about one hour.
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Psychology, University of Turin, Italy.
Each participant was tested in three sessions. Neuropsychological
tasks were administered by two of the authors. Pragmatic tasks were
administered by the same authors with the help of three trained re-
search assistants.
2.4. Data analysis
To analyze differences in performance on the four subscales of










Brain and Language xxx (2017) xxx-xxx 5
linguistic production, extralinguistic production) between patients and
controls, we performed a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measure analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with Factor 1 (patients vs. control) as between-sub-
jects factor, Factor 2 (linguistic vs. extralinguistic) and Factor 3 (com-
prehension vs. production) as within-subjects factors.
In order to compare the cognitive performance of participants with
TBI with that of healthy controls, scores on cognitive tasks were an-
alyzed with independent samples T-Tests. The comparisons were per-
formed separately for each cognitive domain investigated (i.e., work-
ing memory, long-term memory, attention, cognitive flexibility, plan-
ning and overall theory of mind tasks).
Finally, in order to investigate the causal role of background neu-
ropsychological functions - attention and long-term memory (LTM) –
EF - working memory, cognitive flexibility and planning - and over-
all ToM tasks, on the pragmatic performance of patients with TBI, we
created a three-stage hierarchical regression model. These variables
were entered as predictors into the regression model in hierarchical
order of their possible increasing support for impacting on pragmatic
performance – that is comprehension and production subscales on the
linguistic and extralinguistic scales. We entered the background neu-
ropsychological functions in Model 1 of the analysis. Then we inserted
executive functions - working memory, planning and cognitive flexi-
bility - Model 2 - and overall theory of mind - Model 3 – respectively,
in two different consecutive stages, in order to consider their single
distinctive effect on the dependent variables. We included EF in the
regression analysis first and then ToM, since some authors have ar-
gued (Bloom and German, 2000) and empirically reported (Honan et
al., 2015; McDonald et al., 2014) that executive functions may play a
role in solving ToM tasks.
3. Results
3.1. Pragmatic performance
Descriptive statistics for the linguistic and extralinguistic scales are
reported in Table 2.
The repeated measure ANOVA revealed that the main effect of
Factor 1 (patients vs. controls) was significant (F(1,58) = 65.12;
p < 0.0001; η2p = 0.53), indicating that participants with TBI per-
formed significantly worse than healthy controls on the ABaCo. The
main effect of Factor 2 (linguistic vs. extralinguistic) was also signif-
icant (F(1,58) = 26.22; p < 0.001; η
2
p = 0.31), indicating poorer perfor-
mance on the extralinguistic than on the linguistic scales. These main
effects were qualified by a significant Factor 1 × Factor 2 interac-
tion effect (F(1,58) = 5.33; p < 0.05; η
2
p = 0.08). The planned compar-
isons revealed that the effect of Factor 2 (linguistic vs. extralinguistic)
was only significant in the group of TBI individuals (F(1,58) = 27.59;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.32), indicating that only patients, but not controls,
performed worse in extralinguistic tasks than in linguistic ones. The
main effect of Factor 3 (comprehension vs. production) was not sig-
nificant (F(1,58) = 0.091; p = 0.76; η
2
p = 0.002), indicating that no dif-
ferences were found in performance in comprehension vs. production
tasks. To exclude the possibility that differences in post-onset time of
Table 2
Mean and standard deviation of Linguistic and Extralinguistic scales, in both compre-
hension and production subscales.
TBI Controls
Linguistic Comprehension 0.72 (0.17) 0.91 (0.09)
Extralinguistic Comprehension 0.62 (0.22) 0.83 (0.12)
Linguistic Production 0.68 (0.20) 0.92 (0.11)
Extralinguistic Production 0.57 (0.21) 0.92 (0.07)
TBI individuals are responsible for individual differences in the per-
formance on the ABaCo, we calculated Spearman’s correlation co-
efficient with months post-onset and scores on the comprehension
and production subscales of the ABaCo linguistic and extralinguistic
scales of the. No significant correlation was found (0.234 < rs < 0.284,
0.129 < p < 0.214).
3.2. Cognitive performance
3.2.1. Comparison between participants with TBI and healthy
controls
Table 3 shows data on cognitive tasks for participants with TBI and
healthy controls. The comparisons were significant for all the cogni-
tive functions examined (2.47 < t < 9.07; 0.0001 < p < 0.016).
3.3. Explanatory role of executive functions and theory of mind
To explore the possible causal role of cognitive deficit in com-
municative-pragmatic ability, we conducted four multiple regression
analyses using as dependent variable TBI participants’ pragmatic per-
formance on the linguistic and extralinguistic scales, considering com-
prehension and production subscales separately.
Table 4 displays the adjusted regression coefficients ( ) for
each predictor variable, the change in after the addition of execu-
tive functions and theory of mind variables ( ), the change in F
( ) and its significance value ( ).
Cognitive difficulty seems to have an important role in explain-
ing TBI participants’ pragmatic performance on the linguistic and ex-
tralinguistic scales. Model 1 explains a proportion of variance of pa
Table 3
Mean and standard deviation of neuropsychological tests: Attention (Attentional Ma-
trices), Long term memory (Differed recall test), Working Memory (Disyllabic Word
Repetition Test, Corsi’s Block-Tapping Test, Immediate recall test), Cognitive flexibil-
ity (TMT B-A Test), Planning (Tower of London, Elithorn’s Maze Test), overall Theory
of mind (Smarties’ Task, Sally & Ann Task, Strange Stories).
TBI Controls t p
Attention 0.39 (0.27) 0.87 (0.13) 9.07 0.0001
Long term memory 0.26 (0.22) 0.67 (0.13) 8.72 0.0001
Working memory 0.47 (0.27) 0.63 (0.23) 2.47 0.016
Cognitive flexibility 0.52 (0.39) 0.96 (0.10) 5.91 0.001
Planning 0.54 (0.28) 0.89 (0.10) 6.35 0.0001
Overall ToM 0.80 (0.24) 0.97 (0.08) 3.65 0.001
Table 4
Hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting TBI performance on linguis-
tic and extralinguistic scale, in both comprehension and production subscales: Model 1
(Attention, Long term memory), Model 2 (Working memory, Planning, Cognitive flex-
ibility), Model 3 (overall Theory of Mind).
DVs IVs R2Adj R
2
Change FChange Sig. FChange
Linguistic scale
Comprehension Model 1 −0.035 0.037 0.51 0.603
Model 2 0.156 0.265 3.03 0.049
Model 3 0.359 0.190 8.61 0.007
Production Model 1 −0.052 0.021 0.289 0.751
Model 2 0.151 0.276 3.14 0.044
Model 3 0.294 0.143 5.85 0.024
Extralinguistic scale
Comprehension Model 1 −0.018 0.52 0.74 0.487
Model 2 0.206 0.291 3.54 0.030
Model 3 0.292 0.095 3.91 0.060
Production Model 1 0.03 0.072 1.05 0.365
Model 2 0.161 0.234 2.69 0.069
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tients’ pragmatic performance that was similar on the 4 different
subscales, less than 10% of the explained variance: attention and
long-term memory were involved in each of the pragmatic tasks ex-
amined, although their contribution remained at best very modest. The
amount of explained variance tended to increase significantly when
Model 2 (executive functions) was included in the regression analy-
sis: the change in after the addition of executive functions was
significant in linguistic comprehension (F(1,21) = 5.92; p = 0.009), lin-
guistic production (F(1,21) = 3.97; p = 0.034) and extralinguistic com-
prehension (F(1,21) = 4.80; p = 0.038). The inclusion of Model 3 (over-
all ToM tasks) into the regression analyses contributed to better ex-
plaining patients’ pragmatic performance: the introduction of theory
of mind produced a significant change in in linguistic comprehen-
sion (F(1,20) = 8.15; p = 0.010), linguistic production (F(1,20) = 4.97;
p = 0.037) and extralinguistic production (F(1,20) = 10.6; p = 0.003).
Considering the pragmatic performance of healthy controls, Model
1 explains a very limited proportion of variance of less than 11%. No
significant changes in were observed upon introducing Model 2
and Model 3 into the regression analyses (FChange: 0.015 < F < 3.84;
0.063 < p < 0.98).
4. Discussion
In the present research we investigated the role played by back-
ground neuropsychological functions – attention and LTM - executive
functions - WM, planning and cognitive flexibility - and overall ToM
(first and second order) in explaining communicative-pragmatic diffi-
culty in TBI individuals. The novelty of the present research consisted
in studying the role of these cognitive factors in explaining TBI par-
ticipants’ communicative-pragmatic ability in terms of both compre-
hension and production, using linguistic and extralinguistic expressive
means.
In line with our first expectation and with the relevant literature
(Dardier et al., 2011; Murphy et al., 2015; Rousseaux et al., 2010) we
found that TBI participants’ performance, in both comprehension and
production subscales on both the linguistic and extralinguistic scales
of the ABaCo, was significantly worse compared with that of the con-
trol group (Angeleri et al., 2008, 2012; Bosco et al., 2012). Overall, we
also found performance on the extralinguistic (comprehension + pro-
duction subscales) scale to be poorer than that on the linguistic scale
(comprehension + production subscales). This result is not surprising
since the linguistic means of expression is the one more often used to
communicate.
We also administered a series of tests to TBI individuals and con-
trols investigating background neuropsychological functions (LTM
and attention), EF (WM, planning and cognitive flexibility) and over-
all ToM (first and second order). As expected according to the rel-
evant literature (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Happé et al., 1999;
Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006; Martin & McDonald, 2003) individuals
with TBI performed less well in all the investigated components.
Finally, in order to investigate the contribution of EF and ToM to
pragmatic performance, we performed a series of multiple regression
analyses, considering as dependent variable TBI participants’ perfor-
mance on the linguistic and extralinguistic scales in both comprehen-
sion and production subscales (see Table 4), and using the EF investi-
gated (WM, planning and cognitive flexibility) and overall ToM tasks
as predictors.
As reported in Table 4, we controlled first for the role of back-
ground neuropsychological functions - Model 1 (attention and LTM).
We then included as predictor variables executive functions - Model
2 (WM, planning and cognitive flexibility) - and overall theory of
mind abilities - Model 3 (first and second order ToM tasks), which
were considered separately in order to take their single distinctive ef-
fect on pragmatic performance into account. These variables were in-
cluded in the regression model in their hierarchical order of possible
increasing contribution to pragmatic performance, that is, first back-
ground neuropsychological functions (attention and LTM), then exec-
utive functions (WM, planning and cognitive flexibility) and finally
overall ToM tasks.
Our analysis revealed that cognitive impairment plays a role in
pragmatic performance. Background neuropsychological functions –
attention and LTM - were able to explain a proportion of variability in
communicative performance on all our subscales. This seems coher-
ent with the idea that those background neuropsychological functions
support communicative ability, even though their contribution remains
at best very modest. The percentage of explained variance increased
significantly with the inclusion of executive functions in the second
stage of the analysis and theory of mind in the third stage on both the
linguistic subscales, i.e. comprehension and production subscales. As
regards the extralinguistic scale, we found that for the comprehension
subscale the percentage of explained variance increased significantly
for EF and not for ToM, while for the production subscale it was pos-
sible to observe the opposite, i.e. the percentage of explained variance
increased significantly for ToM and not for EF. However, since in
both cases the p-values were not far from significance (p ranging from
0.060 to 0.069), we suggest that the overall trend observed here is in
line with those detected on the linguistic scale. For exploratory pur-
poses we conducted the same analysis in the control sample, but in this
case the insertion of our predictors variable into the regression model
did not significantly increase the proportion of explained variance in
pragmatic performance. Considered as a whole, these results seem to
support the specific role of a deficit in both EF and ToM in explaining
the communicative-pragmatic deficits shown by the TBI individuals
who took part in the present research.
Honan et al. (2015) found that the relationship between ToM
deficits and pragmatic impairments in individuals with TBI may in
fact be mediated by WM demands set by the ToM tasks. McDonald et
al. (2014) also reported that in patients with TBI executive demands
are able to explain a large part of the relationship between ToM and
pragmatic ability, with the exception of ToM tasks in which partici-
pants have to inhibit their own self-perspective, in order to switch to
other people’s perspectives; the difficulty shown by patients in this
task was not accounted for by executive demands, suggesting a dis-
tinctive role of ToM, but only when the task also requires high in-
hibitory control. In line with these studies, our results confirmed the
role that EF, in particular WM, cognitive flexibility and planning, may
play in explaining pragmatic difficulties in TBI individuals. However,
differently from these studies we found that the role of theory of mind
is not accounted for by executive demands, as it persists even after
controlling the contribution of EF. These data are in line with Muller
et al. (2010) who reported a correlation between the comprehension of
indirect speech acts and theory of mind ability, but did not find any
relation between the EF measured (verbal fluency, inhibitory control
and cognitive flexibility) and ToM tasks. Our results therefore confirm
the role of ToM in explaining pragmatic impairments in individuals
with TBI, and that its role cannot be reduced to those of other back-
ground neuropsychological functions – long-term memory and atten-
tion - or high-order executive functions – planning, cognitive flexibil-
ity, working memory.
A limit of the present investigation is that it only considered a lim-
ited number of EF, i.e. WM, planning and cognitive flexibility, while
in the current literature other executive abilities such as inhibitory
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role in pragmatic impairment in TBI individuals (Douglas, 2010;
Honan et al., 2015).
Despite this limitation our results may be helpful in order to bet-
ter comprehend the nature of communicative-pragmatic deficits in pa-
tients with TBI and may have a role in improving rehabilitation pro-
grams (see for example Bosco, Gabbatore, Gastaldo, & Sacco, 2016;
Gabbatore et al., 2015; Sacco et al., 2016) in order to remediate such
difficulties.
Appendix A. Sample items from the pragmatic tasks











4 Sarah and David are at home. Sarah asks
him: “Did you work out today?” David
replies: “I worked out for an hour.”
– What did the boy say to the girl?
– Did the boy work out?
De-
ceit
4 Ryan is playing with a ball in the living
room; he hits a vase, which falls and breaks.
He immediately runs to the sofa, and starts
cuddling his dog. The mom enters the room
and asks him: “Who broke the vase?” Ryan
replies: “It was Fido”
– What did the boy say to the mom?
– Did the boy tell the truth?
– Why did he say that?
Irony 4 Laura and Alex are in a fitting room, where
Laura is trying a dress that is too tight for
her. Laura hesitantly asks Alex: “How does
it fit me?” Alex replies: “Your diet is really
working!”
– What did the boy say to the girl?
– Did he mean what he said?








4 Paul is sitting in the backyard. Beatrice
comes out and asks him: “What would you
like for dinner?”
– What could the boy say to the girl?
De-
ceit
4 Kevin is sit at the dining table, greedily eat-
ing some cupcakes. After a while, Janet ar-
rives and asks Kevin: “Where are the cup-
cakes for grandma?”
– The boy doesn’t want to be caught. What
could he say to the girl?
Irony 4 Sandra is trying a green face-mask, which
she has rubbed all over her face. Tim enters
the room, sees her, and makes an amused
expression. Perplexed, Sandra asks Tim:
“Do you think it’s going to work?”
– Imagine that the boy wants to make fun of









4 Daniel has just made some coffee and is
pouring it into his cup. Julia comes into the
kitchen, dressed in her coat and carrying a
bag, ready to go out. Daniel gestures to her
with the hand he is holding the coffee pot
in, as if to ask her if she would like a cup
too. Julia looks at the clock, then at Daniel,
pulling a face, as if to say “It’s late!”, and
turns to leave.
– What did the girl want to say to the boy?
– Will the girl have the coffee?
De-
ceit
4 Christina is sitting at her desk, intent on
studying. Behind her is Martha, wrapped
only in a bath towel, who, stealthily, with-
out being seen, picks up a sweater that be-
longs to her sister from the back of a chair
and takes it into the bathroom. Immediately
afterwards Christina enters the bathroom,
picks up the sweater and, looking a bit
cross, puts one hand on her hip and looks at
her sister as if to say: “Did you take my
sweater?” Martha shakes her head, with an
innocent face.
– What did the girl want to say to her sis-
ter?
– Did the girl tell the truth?
– Why did she make that gesture?
Irony 4 The scene opens with Peter and Alice in the
kitchen, sitting at a table that has been laid.
Alice gets up to fetch a pan, which she
brings to the table, and pours a ladle of soup
into the dishes. They taste a spoonful and
both pull a disgusted face, as if the soup
were uneatable. Alice looks questioningly at
Peter, who takes his fingers to his mouth
and kisses his fingertips with an expression
as if to say “Delicious!”
– What did the boy want to say to the girl?
– Did he mean it?









4 Diego is sitting on the sofa reading a book.
Madeline enters the room and indicates the
book questioningly, as if to ask “What’s it
like? It’s good, isn’t it?”
– What gesture could the boy answer with?
De-
ceit
4 James eats the last chocolate on a tray on the
table. Stella arrives, looks at the tray and
holds it out to James looking slightly an-
noyed, as if to ask him if he ate the last
chocolate.
– The boy doesn’t want to be found out.
What gesture can he make?
Irony 4 Robert is playing at building a tower with
some colored wooden blocks. Charlotte
comes in and sits next to him and adds a
brick, making the whole tower collapse.
– Imagine the boy wants to make fun of the
girl. What gesture can he make?
Cognitive




This task measures selective visuo-per-
ceptual attention. The experimenter
asks the participant to cross out target
digits in three different matrices
(1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit targets).
Each matrix is made up of 11 rows of
10 digits each; the participant has 45 s















The task measures the span of verbal
working memory. The examiner reads
a list of disyllabic words of increasing
length (2 words, 3 words, 4 words, and
so on). The participant has to repeat
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sequence of up to nine square blocks
positioned on a wooden board, and is








This task measures immediate and de-
ferred recall. The experimenter reads a
story that comprises 28 mnemonic
units (twice). To assess immediate re-
call, the participant is asked to recall












To assess deferred recall, the participant
is asked to recall the story after 15
min, during which s/he has been in-






The task measures cognitive flexibility
in a visual-motor sequencing task. The
task is divided in two parts; both parts
consist of 25 circles distributed over a
sheet of paper. In Part A, the circles
are numbered from 1 to 25, and the
participant is asked to draw lines to
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both numbers (from 1 to 13) and let-
ters (from A to L); the participant is
required to draw lines to connect the
circles in an ascending order, but in
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bers and letters. The difference in
completion time between the two parts





This task measures planning abilities.
Task materials comprise three wooden
pegs of different lengths mounted on a
base; the participant is asked to move
three colored balls (blue, red, and
green) between the pegs to reproduce
an end state shown in a picture. A
problem is accurately solved when the
end state is reproduced in the pre-





This test measures spatial planning abil-
ities using six rectangular and two tri-
angular mazes. The experimenter asks
the participant to trace a path starting
from the bottom of each maze in an
upward direction, keeping to the lines,











This task assesses false-belief under-
standing. The participant is shown a
Smarties box that contains a pencil
rather than the expected candy. The
participant is then asked what another
person—who has not seen the actual
content—will think is inside the tube





This task is a location-change task that
assesses false-belief understanding.
The participant is shown a scenario in
which a doll (Sally) puts a marble in a
basket and then leaves. While she is
gone, another doll (Anne) moves the
marble from the basket to a box. The
participant is asked where Sally will






The Strange Stories assess theory of
mind abilities. Participants are asked
to explain the motivations of story
characters who at the end of each story
produce an utterance (e.g., pretence,
double-bluff). The participant is asked
if what the character said was true, and
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